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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely 
informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be 
avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most 
cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when 
the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the 
"poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country. 
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1. Introduction
War has played an important role in human history. Recently, social scientists have
devoted a great deal of attention to show how rational and fully informed players can
engage in war, e.g. Bueno de Mesquita (1981), ONeill (1990), Hirshleifer (1991), Skaper-
das (1992), Sánchez-Pagés (2006) and Jackson and Morelli (2007). This approach leaves
aside many complications that are relevant to the explanation of wars such as irrational
or incompletely informed players, religion, politics, ethnicity, etc. But by focussing on
such a stylized world, it captures the core of many conicts, namely rational interest in
some valuable resource.1
On the contrary, the question of which kind of agreements can prevent war -which is
a wasteful way to settle conicts- has been relatively neglected. A di¢ culty here is how
to explain the commitment of both parties to the agreed upon course of action. On the
one hand, contracts between two sovereign states are not usually legally enforceable.2
On the other hand, reputation e¤ects can only arise under incomplete information or in
innitely repeated games (Fearon [1995], p. 409).
There is ample historical evidence of such agreements: Roman emperors used to buy
peace with invaders, e.g. Alaric was paid 5,000 pounds of gold, 30,000 pounds of silver
plus other valuables in return for calling o¤ the siege of Rome in AD 409 (Gibbons
[1776-1788], Chap. XXXI). Attila obtained 13.000 pounds of gold during the period
AD 440-450 from the eastern provinces of the Roman empire to stop him from invading
them (Keegan [1994], p. 183). Both Alaric and Attila knew Rome very well. The
rst served in the Roman army and the second spent time in Rome as a hostage. The
eastern Roman emperor Justinian and its Persian counterpart Chosroes negotiated a
long series of agreements, some of which were upheld, e.g. the truce in AD 541 in which
the Persians agreed not to attack Byzantine territory for the next ve years in return
for 5,000 pounds of gold (Evans [1998]). An "everlasting" peace agreement, though,
1The connection between war and games was already noticed by Clausewitz ([1832] Chapter 1, end
of paragraph 21): "War is akin to a card game".
2For instance in Alesina-Spolaore (2005) war may arise from a surprise attack during negotiations.
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lasted only for 10 years. Viking kings used to be "bought o¤" in tenth century England.
They also received Normandy from the king of France in return for lifting the siege of
Paris (Sykes, 2006, p. 263). Christian kingdoms used to extort the Moorish kingdoms in
eleventh century Spain with tributes called Parias in return for peace, but two centuries
earlier similar tributes were paid the other way around (Nelson [1979]). Tribal wars in
Africa were avoided by paying slaves as tribute (Nunn, [2007] p. 6), etc. In many
cases, agreements took place among people who knew each other well and with whom
similar agreements -not all of them upheld- were struck in the past. Thus, it would be
convenient to have an explanation for such agreements that does not rely exclusively on
reputation e¤ects.
Consider the following mechanism. Before war is waged, the potentially attacked
player (the "prey") gives some of resources to the potentially attacking player (the
"predator") with a double target: to compensate him for the expected spoils of war
and to make him so rich that he is no longer interested in waging war. Why is this
so? Because of two reasons: on the one hand, the prey is slimmer after the transfer
so the expected revenue from attacking will be less than before; on the other hand the
predator has more to lose after the transfer because he is now richer. What is not so
clear is that the prey is better o¤, since in some cases peace is bought so dearly that
war might be preferable. The objective of this paper is to explore the possibility of such
agreements in a simple model with two nitely-lived and fully informed players.3
The game is played as follows: In the rst stage transfers are made. In the second
stage players decide simultaneously if they declare war or not. If one of them declares
war, war occurs. In the third stage, if there is war, each player decides the war e¤ort.
In the last stage the outcome of the war is determined and the winner takes all.4 Thus
our model is close to Clausewitzs (1976) concept of absolute war.5
We assume that the probability of winning war is a function of war e¤orts and two
3Thus the question of the distribution of the characteristics of the population, that plays an important
role in the analysis of conicts in Esteban and Ray (1999) does not arise here.
4Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003, p. 417) consider three outcomes following
the defeat of a leader (nation): conscation of resources, to install a puppet king and to alter the
institutional arrangements in the defeated country. In our model we only consider the rst alternative.
5See Smith and Stam (2004) for a model of war more akin to Clausewitzs limited wars.
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parameters: the (relative) military prociency of Player 1 and the responsiveness of
the probability of winning war to war e¤orts. The latter is an inverse measure of the
role of chance in war. For simplicity, we assume that a xed proportion of war e¤orts
can be recovered by the winner, so a xed proportion of resources are lost in the war.
Players are endowed with a resource that can be devoted to war e¤ort or consumed.
The resources of Player 1 are larger than those of Player 2 so the rst (resp. second)
player will be called the rich (resp. poor) player. Thus in our model there are four
parameters: military prociency, the role of chance in war, the (marginal) cost of war
and the inequality of resources between players.
In order to highlight the role of each parameter, we start analyzing in Section 3 the
case where both players are equally procient and the probability of winning the war is
proportional to war e¤orts. In this case, the unique source of asymmetry among players
is derived from the di¤erences in resources. We have two kind of results. Firstly, on the
occurrence of war if no transfers are made. Secondly, on how war can be avoided by
making transfers.6
In absence of transfers, only the relatively poor player has incentives to attack when
inequality of resources is large and the marginal cost of war is not small. Inequality is
a necessary condition for the war to occur. However, it is far from being a su¢ cient
condition. Other factors also play a role, for instance Player 2 must use all his resources
in the war but Player 1 does not (we say that Player 2 is constrained but Player 1 is
unconstrained). In any other case, peace is an equilibrium outcome. If both players are
unconstrained (the marginal cost of war is bigger than 0.5), aggression does not pay
because it entails a small expected gain and a large loss of resources. If both agents
are constrained, war entails too much destruction because both players commit all their
resources to the conict and since the probability of winning is proportional to war
e¤orts, in the most favorable case (zero marginal cost of war) they can only expected to
gain exactly what they had before the war. If only Player 2 is constrained, the role of
6 In games with incomplete information, transfers may signal a "chicken" attitude of the prey so they
may exacerbate the demands of the predator and make war inevitable. We do not discuss whether this
e¤ect exists. We just point out that, at least in some cases, there is also a good side of "being chicken"
namely that an increase in the wealth of our enemy may make it less aggressive.
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inequality of resources is clear, Player 2 attacks in the hope of becoming rich. However,
the e¤ect of the marginal cost of war is contrary to what intuition might suggest. A
high cost of war may yield incentives to Player 2 to attack since the resources used in
war by Player 1 are decreasing with the cost of the war. Thus, when this cost is high,
the chance for Player 2 to win the war is greater than when this cost is small.
Transfers avoid war unless inequality of resources is very large. The transfer from
the rich to the poor country reduces resource inequality and induces a peaceful behavior
in the poor country.7
In Section 4, we analyze the consequences of making the probability of winning less
responsive to war e¤orts. We show that this gives even more incentives to the poor
player to start a war since from his point of view is just a lottery with a fair outcome.
In the limit (when war is just a lottery) war is possible even in the absence of inequality.
This is because when the success of war is not very sensitive to war e¤orts, both players
use only a small part of their resources in war and the loot of the winner is considerable.
Also in this case, if inequality of resources is not very large, transfers from the rich to
the poor country will avoid war. A transfer acts as a costless lottery that leaves both
players better o¤.
The analysis of Sections 3 and 4 gives a good explanation of the uneven contenders
paradox, raised by Clausewitz (1832), where one weak country initiates war, even though
the rich country has a higher probability of winning the war. In the words of Adam
Smith (1776, p.659) An industrious, and upon that account a wealthy nation, is of all
nations the most likely to be attacked.
Finally, in Section 5 we analyze the case where the rich country has an advantage
in military prociency. This advantage gives incentives to the rich player to attack
in the absence of transfers. For this to occur its military prociency should be high,
the resources of the poor can not be too small (so the potential loot is large) and the
marginal cost of war has to be small (so the winner can recoup a large part of war
e¤orts). But in this case, transfers from the poor to the rich would avoid war. A large
inequality protects the weak player (Player 2) from an attack by Player 1, since this
7An implication of this result is that it may be not a good idea to make your enemy poorer because
this may make war unstoppable.
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player has little to gain. Thus, in our mode, it is the asymmetry in military prociency
that makes possible that the stronger player initiates the war as in Bueno de Mesquita
(1981, pp. 129 and 155).
Summing up, we nd that the transfer mechanism avoids war in a large number of
cases showing that peaceful agreements may be reached in a world where no commitment
is possible. This agrees with the observation of Morrow (2008) that "interstate war is
very rare" and that "most disputes are resolved without escalating to war" (op.cit. pp.
11-13).
Relationship with the Literature
Hirshleifer (1991), proposed a model of conict where poorer combatants often end
up improving their position relative to richer ones. He called this the Paradox of Power.
This is close to our observation that a high cost of war may yield incentives to the poor
player to attack. But our models are di¤erent. First Hirshleifer does not study the
incentives for declaring war he just assumes that both countries are at war. Second,
in his model there is production and the marginal cost of war is one. Finally and
most important, he does not discuss the role of transfers to overcome the problem of
commitment.
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) consider a sequential game with perfect infor-
mation where countries can make demands on each other. They can grant the demands,
challenge the demand or negotiate (with commitment). Under complete information and
when domestic factors (such as the ideology of the supporting coalition) do not play any
role, war never arises in equilibrium (they call this case "Realpolitik"). This is because
they either negotiate or remain at the status quo. However, when domestic factors play
a role, war is possible.
Powell (1996) analyzed a dynamic model where "a state that is declining in power
is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state
prefers to appease the rising states demands rather than go to war to oppose them"
(p.749). These appeasement takes the form of "salami tactics" where little concessions
are made over time. Under complete information the policy of appeasement brings
peace always (p. 755). There are several di¤erences between our models: Our´s is a
model of a "decisive battle", not of a series of small conicts so appeasement does not
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make much sense. Also, in his model the aggressor is exogenously chosen to be the
rising state.
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003) consider a model where
leaders have to obtain the support of a winning coalition in order to ght a war. After
the war is fought the members of the winning coalition. . . . . . decide whether to retain
their leader or to defect to a domestic political rival(p. 265). Their model is somewhat
similar to ours: war is modeled as a costly lottery and the probability that a country
wins the war is increasing in e¤ort which is a choice variable of leaders. However, the
cost of war is xed (pp. 227-8) and they do not consider the possibility to make transfers
that may stop war.
Jackson and Morelli (2007) studies how the decisions to go to war depend on the
political bias of the decision makers. Political bias refers to the discrepancy between the
interests of decision makers and citizens. They do not distinguish between war e¤ort
and resources and thus the consideration of the constraints of resources on war e¤ort,
that plays a prominent role in our analysis, is absent there. The center of Jackson
and Morellis paper is the case where both parties can commit. They also give some
results on the non commitment case. Firstly, if the decision makers are unbiased, two
countries may decide to go to war depending on the responsiveness of the probability
of winning the war to the di¤erence in resources. This is very close to our Proposition
4 and 6. Secondly, "it is possible that too high a transfer will lead to war while a
lower transfer will avoid a war". This is because the larger transfer will increase the
probability that the poor country wins the war. Thirdly, their Proposition 4 asserts that
"if the probability of winning is proportional to relative wealths..... two.. countries will
never go to war if they can make transfers to each other (even without commitment)".
The reason is that if the winning probabilities are proportional no country wants to
go to war in the absence of transfers, which is our Proposition 1. Thus, our paper
complements and extends their ndings in the case of non commitment.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. We present our model in Section 2. In Sections
3, 4 and 5, we analyze the incentives for both players to go to war and when war can
be avoided by transfers. Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests some avenues of
further research. All the proofs are gathered in an appendix.
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2. The Model
There are two players with resources V1 and V2. W.l.o.g. we will assume that V1 > V2.
They play the following game.
In the rst stage, each player may transfer part of his resources to the other player.
In the second stage, each of them decides whether to declare war on the other player
or not. If one of them declares war, war occurs. If both abstain from declaring war,
peace results.
In the third stage, if there is peace, the game ends. Payo¤ to player i is his resource
Vi, i = 1; 2: If there is a war, each player has to commit part of his resources to the war
e¤ort, denoted by ei, i = 1; 2: It is assumed that there is no outside credit and therefore
no player can use in the war more than his available resources.8
In the fourth stage, war is waged. The outcome is partially determined by nature
and partially determined by war e¤orts.9 Thus in our model, the wealth of a nation does
not translate automatically into military capabilities as in Bueno de Mesquita (1981, p.
102) and Jackson and Morelli (2007).
If pi is the probability that player i = 1; 2 wins the war, we assume that
p1 =
e1
e1 + e

2
and p2 =
e2
e1 + e

2
;  2 (0;1); 0    1. (2.1)
The functions in (2.1) are called contest success functions (CSF): The parameter  is
a measure of the war skills of Player 1. When  = 1, we will say that the CSF are
symmetric. The parameter  measures the sensitivity of the probability of winning war
to the e¤orts. When  = 0, the outcome of war is purely random. When  = 1, we will
say that the CSF are proportional.
A motivation for this functional form is that it seems reasonable to require that the
CSF is homogeneous of degree zero, so winning probabilities do not depend on how
resources are measured (pounds or francs, number or thousands of soldiers, etc.). Clark
and Riis (1998), following Skaperdas (1996), have shown that under certain assumptions
the only functional form that is homogeneous of degree zero is precisely the one above.
8A good motivation for the assumption that there is only one player by nation is presented by Bueno
de Mesquita (1981), p. 28.
9See Clausewitz (1832), Chapters 7 and 8 for a brief description of the role of chance in war.
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We will assume that there is a winner who takes all, i.e. the war does not end in a
stalemate. Assume that a xed proportion of the war e¤ort, say k, can not be recovered
by the winner, with 0  k  1. The parameter k is the marginal cost of e¤ort.
For simplicity we assume, as it is customary in the literature, that players are risk-
neutral.10 Thus, the payo¤ of, say Player 1, if he wins the contest is V1+V2 k(e1+e2)
and zero otherwise. Let V  V1 + V2. Expected payo¤ of player i; denoted by Ei, is
Ei = pi(V   k(e1 + e2)): (2.2)
Finally we assume that information is complete and that the equilibrium concept is
subgame perfection.
The game is characterized by four parameters, V2=V; k; ; : In order to analyze
how the solution of the game depends on those parameters, we will proceed as follows.
First, in Section 3 we solve the case where CSF are proportional and symmetric. In
Section 4 we consider CSF which are symmetric but non proportional and in Section 5
we consider CSF which are non symmetric but proportional. The analysis in these last
two sections complements the one in Section 3 and allows to highlight the role of  and
 respectively.
3. The Game with Symmetric and Proportional CSF ( = 1;  = 1)
In this case, the CSF reads
pi =
ei
e1 + e2
; i = 1; 2: (3.1)
Thus, the expected payo¤ of player i, is
Ei = pi(V   k(e1 + e2)) = ei
e1 + e2
(V   k(e1 + e2)) = eiV
e1 + e2
  kei: (3.2)
We solve the game backwards. Since no player has to move in the fourth stage, let us
begin by analyzing the third stage. Setting @Ei@ei = 0; we get:
e1(e2) =
r
V e2
k
  e2 and e2(e1) =
r
V e1
k
  e1; (3.3)
10See Cornes and Hartley (2005) for contests where players are risk averse. In the nal section we
will discuss how risk aversion may a¤ect our results.
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Figure 1 below shows the case where V=k = 16: This gure can be interpreted as the
best reply function of Player 1 and Player 2 when no agent is constrained. In this case,
we readily see that the maximum e¤ort occurs when ei = V4k which is also the solution
to (3.3) above.
1512.5107.552.50
15
12.5
10
7.5
5
2.5
0
e2
e1
Best Reply Player 1
Best Reply Player 2
Figure 1
In the interval where Player 1 becomes constrained by his resources, his best reply
becomes totally at (a vertical line in the case of Player 2). Thus, it is clear that we
have only the following possibilities: both players are unconstrained; both players are
constrained or just one player is constrained. Let us analyze each of these cases in turn.
3.1. Both Players Are Unconstrained
This case arises i¤ the resources in the hands of each player are larger than the solution
to (3.3), i.e. V  4kV1 and V  4kV2; or equivalently,
1
4k
 V2
V
 4k   1
4k
: (3.4)
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Notice that this case can only occurs for k  0:5: For those values of k, 4k 14k  0:5; and
since V2 < V1; V2V  0:5: Thus the above inequalities can be summarized as
k  0:5; and V2
V
 1
4k
: (3.5)
Then, equilibrium occurs at
e1 = e

2 =
V
4k
: (3.6)
Payo¤s amount to
E1 = E

2 =
V
4
: (3.7)
3.2. Player 1 is Unconstrained and Player 2 is Constrained
This case arises i¤ the resources in the hand of Player 2 are smaller than the solution
to (3.3), i.e. V > 4kV2; and the best reply of Player 1 to V2 (e1(V2) described in (3.3))
is smaller than V1; i.e.
q
V V2
k   V2  V1; or equivalently,
V2
V
< minfk; 1
4k
g: (3.8)
Equilibrium occurs at
e1 =
r
V V2
k
  V2 and e2 = V2: (3.9)
Payo¤s amount to
E1 = V + kV2   2
p
V V2k and E2 =
p
V V2k   kV2: (3.10)
3.3. Both Players are Constrained
This case arises i¤ @Ei(V1;V2)@ei > 0, which implies,
k <
V2
V
: (3.11)
We see that equilibrium occurs at
e1 = V1 and e

2 = V2: (3.12)
E1 = V1(1  k) and E2 = V2(1  k): (3.13)
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In Figure 2 below, the increasing line corresponds to V2V = k; and the decreasing line
corresponds to V2V =
1
4k :
10.750.50.25
0.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
0
k
V2/V
Case 3.3
Both Players
Constrained
Case 3.1
Both Players
Unconstrained
Case 3.2
Player 1 Unconstrained
Player 2 Constrained
Figure 2
Case 3.1 occurs in the area above the decreasing line. Case 3.2 occurs in the area to
the right of the increasing line and below the decreasing line. Finally, Case 3.3 occurs
in the area to the left of the increasing line.
We are now ready to analyze the second stage of the game by comparing the expected
payo¤s obtained under war with the payo¤s in the case of peace, assuming that no
transfers have been made in the rst stage. Then, peace occurs i¤ Ei  Vi, i = 1; 2.
If both players are unconstrained, V4  kV1; V4  kV2; since k  1; Ei  Vi for all
i = 1; 2: Thus, war in this case is not protable.
If both players are constrained, Ei = Vi(1  k) for all i = 1; 2; which conrms that
war is not protable either. We record these ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If both players are unconstrained or both players are constrained, no
war is declared in equilibrium in the absence of transfers.
The interpretation of this result is the following: In case 3.1 both players are not
very di¤erent and the technology of recovery of the spoils of war is not very e¢ cient
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(i.e. k larger than :5). Therefore, aggression does not pay because it entails a small
expected gain and a large loss of resources. War in case 3.3 entails too much destruction
because both players commit all their resources to the conict, and since the probability
of winning is proportional to war e¤orts, in the most favorable case (k = 0) they can
only expected to gain their initial resources.
The analysis of Case 3.2 is far more interesting. Recall that in this case, V2V 
minfk; 14kg. Peace occurs i¤
E1 = V + kV2   2
p
V V2k  V1; or equivalently V2
V
 4k
(1 + k)2
; (3.14)
and E2 =
p
V V2k   kV2  V2; or equivalently k
(1 + k)2
 V2
V
: (3.15)
The inequality V2V  4k(1+k)2 holds in Case 3.2 since V2V  minfk; 14kg; and k  4k(1+k)2
for all k 2 [0; 1]: Thus, it is never in the interest of Player 1 to declare war. However,
inequality (3.15) not always hold, thus if V2V <
k
(1+k)2
Player 2 has an incentive to declare
war. This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose Case 3.2 holds. In the absence of transfers, war is declared by
Player 2 i¤ V2V <
k
(1+k)2
: For any other values of the parameters, peace is the equilibrium
outcome of the game.
Proposition 2 says that if Player 1 is su¢ ciently rich with respect to Player 2, the
poor player has an incentive to declare war. The poor player declares war in the hope of
becoming rich. But the e¤ect of k is contrary to what intuition might suggest, which is
that when the marginal cost of war is high, war would not pay o¤. This counterintuitive
result comes from the fact that the resources committed to war by Player 1 decrease
with k and, thus, the larger k the larger is the probability that Player 2 wins the war.
This makes the payo¤ for Player 2 in the case of war increasing in k and explains the
result.
In Figure 3 below we picture the function V2V =
k
(1+k)2
as a dotted line. The area
enclosed by the three lines corresponds to parameters for which there is peace. The
area below the dotted line corresponds to values of parameters where 2 declares war if
no transfers have been made in the rst stage.
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A rough estimate of the probability that war arises can be obtained by assuming
that k V2V is uniformly distributed in [0; 1] [0; 0:5]. If so, the probability of war when
no transfer has been made yet, denoted by Pr(warNT ) is
Pr(warNT ) =
Z 1
0
(
Z k
(1+k)2
0
2dx)dk = 0:386 29: (3.16)
10.750.50.250
0.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
0
k
V2/V
Peace Peace
Peace
War declared by 2 in the
absence of transfers
Figure 3
Now we are ready for the analysis of the rst stage of the game. In particular we
look for a transfer T from Player 1 to Player 2 with the following properties:
1. Before the transfer, equilibrium means war. That is, case 3.2 occurs and war is
declared by Player 2, V2V <
k
(1+k)2
:
2. After the transfer, both players are better o¤ than if there had being a war. That
is,
 kV2
V
+
r
V2
V
k  V2 + T
V
  kV2
V
+ 2
r
V2
V
k; (3.17)
where the rst (resp. the second) inequality corresponds to the expected value of
Player 2 (resp. Player 1) before the transfer being smaller than his resources after
the transfer.
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3. After the transfer, peace is an equilibrium outcome.
Either we are in Case 3.1, i.e.,
1
4k
 V2 + T
V
; k  0:5; (3.18)
or in Case 3.2 with peace,
k
(1 + k)2
 V2 + T
V
< min(
1
4k
; k); (3.19)
or in Case 3.3,
k <
V2 + T
V
<
1
4k
: (3.20)
If T satises Conditions 1, 2 and 3, we will say that a peace agreement is feasible.
In Figure 3 we visualize the possible cases that can occur. For k = 1; after the
transfer we can only be in Case 3.1, the area above the decreasing line. For k 2 [0:5; 1);
after the transfer we can be either in Case 3.1 or in Case 3.2, but if Case 3.1 can be
achieved with a certain transfer, Case 3.2 can be achieved with a smaller transfer (see
Appendix, Lemma 1). For k 2 (0; 0:5); after the transfer we can be either in Case 3.2
or in Case 3.3, but if Case 3.3 can be achieved with a certain transfer, Case 3.2 can be
achieved with a smaller transfer (see Appendix, Lemma 2). Therefore, for all k 2 (0; 1)
we only have to explore the existence of a peace agreement such that after the transfer
we are in Case 3.2. Summing up, we need to study under what conditions there is a
transfer T such that
max(
k
(1 + k)2
; kV2
V
+
r
V2
V
k)  V2 + T
V
 min( 1
4k
; k; kV2
V
+ 2
r
V2
V
k): (3.21)
Let x1(k) 2 [0; k(1+k)2 ) be a solution of k(1+k)2 =  kx+ 2
p
xk: x1(k) exists (see Lemma
4) and it is the key ingredient that allows to characterize the conditions under which a
transfer T satisfying (3.21) can exist. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For each k 2 (0; 1]; a peace agreement is feasible if and only if V2V >
x1(k): The minimal transfer, T^ ; that avoids war is such that it makes Player 2 be indif-
ferent between war and peace, that is, V2+T^V =
k
(1+k)2
:
15
Figure 4 summarizes the above result. The area below the dot line (x1(k)) represents
the area where a peace agreement is impossible. If resource inequality is very large,
negotiations cannot avoid war because the minimal transfer that will stop Player 2 to
declare war is too expensive for Player 1. Above the x1(k) line, peace is possible. The
transfer that avoids war increases with k; thus reecting that, as we remarked before,
the war e¤ort of Player 1 decreases with k: So a high k increases the probability that
Player 2 wins the war and therefore increases the transfer that makes Player 2 peaceful.
It is worth noting that in the worst situation, a peace agreement can be reached when
the resources of the poorest player are at least 2.9 per cent of the total resources: Again,
an idea of the probability that war will arise when transfers can be made is obtained
assuming that k  V2V is uniformly distributed in [0; 1] [0; 0:5]. The probability of war
with transfers denoted by Pr(warT ) is
Pr(warT ) =
Z 1
0
(
Z x1(k)
0
2dx)dk = 0:046496:
This probability is, approximately, eight times smaller that the probability of war with-
out transfers (0:386 29).
10.750.50.250
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Peace Peace
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4. The Game with a Symmetric CSF ( = 1; 0    1)
In this section we consider a generalized symmetric form of the CSF used in the previous
section. We will see that symmetry in the CSF implies that the rich player never has
an incentive to declare war. But, contrary to what happened in the previous section,
there may be an incentive to wage war even when both players are unconstrained and
their resources are very similar or when both players are constrained. In the rst case, a
peaceful arrangement (with the appropriate transfer) is always possible. Unfortunately,
in the second case there are instances in which no transfers can stop war.
Suppose that the CSF is of the following form
pi =
ei
e1 + e

2
; i = 1; 2 with 0    1. (4.1)
This is the CSF proposed by Tullock (1980) that has been ubiquitously used in the
literature. It reduces to the form postulated in Section 3 when  = 1. Now expected
payo¤s for player i; denoted by Ei, assuming that war has been declared are
Ei = pi(V   k(e1 + e2)) = e

i
e1 + e

2
(V   k(e1 + e2)): (4.2)
Noting that p2 = 1  p1 we have that
@E1
@e1
=
e2e
 1
1 
(e1 + e

2)
2
(V   k(e1 + e2))  p1k; (4.3)
@E2
@e2
=
e1e
 1
2 
(e1 + e

2)
2
(V   k(e1 + e2))  (1  p1)k: (4.4)
Setting @E1@e1 = 0; i = 1; 2, and dividing (4.3) by (4.4) we obtain that e
+1
1 = e
+1
2 which
implies that e1 = e2: Now (4.3) reads
@Ei
@ei
=
e2 1i
4e2i
(V   2kei)  k
2
= 0; i = 1; 2: (4.5)
The solution to (4.5) is,
e1 = e

2 =
V
2k( + 1)
and E1 = E

2 =
V
2( + 1)
: (4.6)
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4.1. Both players are unconstrained
This case arises if the following inequality holds,
V1  V
2k( + 1)
and V2  V
2k( + 1)
. (4.7)
Since V1 > V2, if the second inequality holds, the rst inequality also holds.
For war to be a rational option, we need the following:
V
2( + 1)
> V1 or
V
2( + 1)
> V2. (4.8)
We rst notice that it is impossible that both inequalities occur, because adding them
up we get V+1 > V which is impossible. This implies that Player 1 has no incentive to
go to war because if it had, Player 2 would also have incentives to declare war (since
V1 > V2). Thus, we are left with the case where only the second inequality in (4.8)
holds, so the second country has an incentive to go to war. Notice that, contrarily to
the case in which  = 1, war is now possible: Indeed, the occurrence of war is equivalent
to
V2  V
2k( + 1)
and
V
2( + 1)
> V2; (4.9)
which is possible whenever  < k: Our next result summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 4. When the CSF are of the form (4.1), and both players are uncon-
strained, in the absence of transfers, no war is declared for any   k. When  < k,
war is declared by Player 2 for any value of V2=V 2 [ 2k(+1) ; 12(+1)).
We see that the occurrence of war depends on several factors. First, the probability
of winning the war should not depend very much on war e¤orts relative to the marginal
cost of war, k. For a small  the poor player has a chance of winning the war without
much e¤ort which implies a sizeable loot should war be won. Second, the ratio of the
resources of Player 2 with respect to those of Player 1 should not be too high, -because
otherwise Player 2 risks a lot- nor too low, because in this case Player 2 is constrained.
An important consequence of this result is that when  ! 0; war is possible for any
value of V2=V . In other words, here war is possible even in the absence of inequality.
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This is because when the success of war is not very sensitive to war e¤orts, both players
use only a small part of their resources in war and the loot of the winner is considerable.
Let us study equilibrium in the rst stage of the game. Consider the minimum
transfer that leaves Player 2 indi¤erent between peace and war, namely
V2 + T^ =
V
2( + 1)
: (4.10)
Notice that T^ is always smaller than V1 (if it were not, V2(+1)   V2 > V1, or V2(+1) > V
which is impossible). After the transfer, both players will be better o¤ than if they
had have a war, Player 1 will still be unconstrained and no one will have incentives to
declare war. The following proposition proves that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 5. When the CSF are of the form (4.1) and both players are uncon-
strained, a peace agreement is feasible. The minimal transfer that avoids war is such
that it makes Player 2 be indi¤erent between war and peace, that is V2 + T^ = V2(+1) :
The interpretation of this result is that, as we saw before, war is a rational option
for Player 2 when it is a kind of lottery, i.e. the outcome of the war does not depend
much on war e¤orts. But in this case a transfer acts as a costless lottery that leaves
both players better o¤.
4.2. Both Players are Constrained
This case arises i¤ @Ei(V1;V2)@ei > 0, or equivalently:
V 2 
(V 1 + V

2 )
V (1  k) > V1k; (4.11)
V 1 
(V 1 + V

2 )
V (1  k) > V2k: (4.12)
Notice rst that Player 1 constrained (inequality (4.11)) implies Player 2 constrained
(inequality (4.12)).
In this case, Ei =
V i
V 1 +V

2
V (1 k); i = 1; 2: Since the probability of winning for Player
1 is increasing with ; :
V 1
(V 1 + V

2 )
V (1  k)  V1
(V1 + V2)
V (1  k) = V1(1  k)  V1; (4.13)
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which implies that Player 1 has no incentive to declare war.
However, contrary to the case in which  = 1, war is now possible. For Player 2 to
have an incentive to declare war, Ei > V2 should hold. Combining this inequality with
(4.11),
1  V

2
(V 1 + V

2 )
(1  k)
k
<
V2
V
<
V 2
(V 1 + V

2 )
(1  k): (4.14)
Notice rst that if  = 1; the above inequality never holds (as we proved in Section 3).
But when k = 0 and  2 (0; 1); the above condition always holds. Firstly because for
k = 0; both players are constrained no matter how the resources are distributed (see
conditions (4.11) and (4.12)). Secondly; V

2
(V 1 +V

2 )
is decreasing with ; thus the second
inequality in (4.14) is trivially satised: So in those situations Player 2 always has an
incentive to declare war and no transfer will avoid war. Since k = 0; the minimal
transfer that will stop Player 2 from declaring war should be such that resources of
both players are equalized. But then, Player 1 will not be better o¤ because before
the transfer he expects in the worse case ( = 0) half of the resources. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. When the CSF are of the form (4.1), k = 0, and  2 (0; 1); war is
always declared by Player 2 and there is no transfer that avoids war.
The interpretation of this result is that when the war is costless, war is a good option
because the transfers that would make Player 2 peaceful are too costly for Player 1.
If k > 0 we can nd values for V2 for which war is avoidable. In particular, V2
should be such that the minimal transfer needed to avoid war by Player 2 is less than
the total cost of war, kV: Otherwise, Player 1 will not agree on the transfer. This result
is shown in the following proposition. Let V2 be such that the minimal transfer that
makes Player 2 indi¤erent between war and peace is kV:
Proposition 7. When the CSF are of the form (4.1), both players are constrained, and
(4.14) holds, a peace agreement is feasible if k > 0 and V2  V2:
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4.3. Player 1 is Unconstrained and Player 2 is Constrained.
As in the previous cases, we will show here that Player 1 has no incentive to start a
war. We can conclude that symmetry of the CSF implies that the rich player never has
an incentive to declare war.
This case arises if V2 < e2 and
@E1(V1;V2)
@e1
< 0; or equivalently
V2
V
<

2k( + 1)
; and (4.15)
V 2 
(V 1 + V

2 )
V (1  k) < V1k: (4.16)
The optimal e¤ort of Player 1 in case of war is the solution of
V 2 
(e1 + V

2 )
(V   (e1 + V2)k) = e1k; (4.17)
The expected payo¤ of Player 1 is
E1 =
e1
(e1 + V

2 )
(V   (e1 + V2)k): (4.18)
Since e1 < V1,
e1
(e1 + V

2 )
(V   (e1 + V2)k)  V

1
(V 1 + V

2 )
(V   (e1 + V2)k): (4.19)
Since the probability of winning for Player 1 is increasing with ;
V 1
(V 1 + V

2 )
(V   (e1 + V2)k)  V1
(V1 + V2)
(V   (e1 + V2)k) < V1 (4.20)
Thus, Player 1 has no incentive to declare war.
We leave the analysis of this case here because it is qualitatively identical to the
case when  = 1:
5. The Game with Asymmetric and Proportional CSF ( = 1;  2 [1;1))
In this section we consider an asymmetric CSF in which the rich country has advantage
in military prociency. We show that when both countries are unconstrained no player
21
has an incentive to declare war, no matter how high the military prociency of the rich
country is. When both countries are constrained, in some cases, the rich country would
have an incentive to declare war but there is a transfer that will avoid war.
Consider a CSF of the following form
p1 =
e1
e1 + e2
and p2 =
e2
e1 + e2
;  2 [1;1). (5.1)
It reduces to the form postulated in Section 3 when  = 1. We assume   1 because in
many cases, war prociency is positively correlated with relative wealth, i.e. countries
that are good at producing wealth are also good at producing weapons.
Expected payo¤s for Players 1 and 2 when war is declared are
E1 =
e1
e1 + e2
(V   k(e1 + e2)) and E2 = e2
e1 + e2
(V   k(e1 + e2)): (5.2)
From the denition of expected payo¤s we obtain
@E1
@e1
= 
V e2   k(e21 + 2e1e2 + e22)
(e1 + e2)2
and (5.3)
@E2
@e2
=
V e1   k(e22 + 2e1e2 + e21)
(e1 + e2)2
: (5.4)
Setting @Ei@ei = 0, i = 1; 2 , we get that
e1 =
 e2 +
q
e22(1  ) + V e2k

and e2 =  e1+
r
e21(  1) +
V e1
k
: (5.5)
Solving (5.5) we obtain
e1 =
V
2k(1 +
p
)
and e2 =
V
p

2k(1 +
p
)
: (5.6)
5.1. Both Players Are Unconstrained
In this case,
e1 =
V
2k(1 +
p
)
 V1 and e2 =
V
p

2k(1 +
p
)
 V2: (5.7)
These inequalities above can be written as
p

2k(1 +
p
)
 V2
V
 1  1
2k(1 +
p
)
: (5.8)
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Expected payo¤s read:
E1 =
V
p

2(1 +
p
)
and E2 =
V
2(1 +
p
)
: (5.9)
Notice that the total expected payo¤ under war is V=2: So Player 1 has no incentive
to declare war because his expected payo¤ is less than V1: Player 2 had no incentive
to declare war when  = 1; so he can not have any incentive to declare war when
 > 1 because his expected payo¤ is decreasing with :
The following Proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 8. When CSF is of the form (5.1) and both players are unconstrained,
peace is an equilibrium outcome in absence of transfers.
5.2. Both Players are Constrained
This case arises i¤ @Ei(V1;V2)@ei > 0, or equivalently:
V V2 > k(V
2
1 + 2V1V2 + V
2
2 ) and V V1 > k(V
2
2 + 2V1V2 + V
2
1 ); (5.10)
which can be written as
(
V
V2
+
V2
V
  2) + 2  V2
V
<
1
k
; and (5.11)
(V2V )
2
(1  V2V )
+ 1 +
V2
V
<
1
k
: (5.12)
Let us see rst that if Player 1 is constrained, Player 2 is also constrained, i.e. that
(5.11) implies (5.12). Let
G(;
V2
V
)  (V2
V
+
V
V2
  2) + 2  V2
V
; and F (;
V2
V
)  (
V2
V )
2
(1  V2V )
+ 1 +
V2
V
: (5.13)
Since G(; V2V ) is increasing with  and G(1;
V2
V ) =
V
V2
; F (; V2V ) is decreasing with  and
F (1; V2V ) =
V
V1
; and V1 > V2; then for all  > 1; G(; V2V ) > F (;
V2
V ). Thus, both players
are constrained if and only if
1
k
> G(;
V2
V
): (5.14)
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Expected payo¤s read:
E1(V1; V2) =
V1V (1  k)
V1 + V2
and E2(V1; V2) =
V2V (1  k)
V1 + V2
: (5.15)
The probability of winning for Player 2 decreases with the military prociency of Player
1, so if Player 2 had no incentive to declare war when  = 1; he does not have one now.
The probability of winning for Player 1 increases with his military prociency, thus, if
the cost of war is not too high relative to the inequality of resources and his military
prociency, Player 1 has an incentive to declare war. The following proposition formally
states this result. The condition under which Player 1 will declare war follows directly
from E1(V1; V2) > V1:
Proposition 9. When CSF is of the form (5.1) and both players are constrained, in
the absence of transfers war is declared by Player 1 if and only if
k <
V2
V
(  1)

; (5.16)
Player 2 has no incentive to declare war.
In the next proposition we study the possibility of avoiding war by transfers, in this
case from the poor to the rich country.
Proposition 10. When CSF is of the form (5.1) and both players are constrained, if
k < V2V
( 1)
 ; a peace agreement is feasible if
V2
V
>
  2
  1 : (5.17)
The minimal transfer, T^ ; that avoids war is such that makes Player 1 be indi¤erent
between war and peace.
To complete the analysis of this asymmetric case, we would need to study what will
happen in the situation where Player 1 is unconstrained and Player 2 is constrained.
The analysis of this part is more complicated, and we believe that will not bring any
new insights. What is important in the analysis of the asymmetric case is the fact that
it is the rich country that has an incentive to declare war, and that a transfer from the
poor to the rich will avoid war.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we presented a simple model of war where players are rational, information
is complete and there are no binding agreements. We have shown that it is possible to
avoid war by transferring resources from one player to another: from the rich to the
poor player (Sections 3 and 4) or from the poor to the rich when the military prociency
of the rich is high (Section 5).
Clearly, our model is very simple. In order to have a broader picture, other factors
like dynamics, heterogeneous resources and risk-averse players should be considered.
Other functional forms of CSF and the cost of war should be tried as well.
To end the paper, we discuss other mechanisms of altering initial conditions to the
advantage of one or several players, that have been used in other parts of the literature.11
1: Burning money. In some games, the outcome in equilibrium is a¤ected by
the capability of a player to destroy her own resources (van Damme [1989], Ben-Porath
and Dekel [1992]). This resembles what happens here but the mechanism by which the
destruction a¤ects the outcome is very di¤erent. In "burning money" games, it is a
signal that one of the players is going after a certain payo¤ in a subgame. In our case,
it is a way of reaching a certain subgame.
2: Transfer/Destruction of Endowments. In General Equilibrium models it is
sometimes good for a country to transfer goods to another country. This is the so-called
"Transfer Paradox" in International Trade (Leontief [1937], Samuelson [1952], [1954],
Gale [1974]). The paradox arises because by making a transfer (or even by destroying
one´s resources, as in Aumann and Peleg [1974]) agents a¤ect relative prices. Again, our
case is di¤erent because in our model there is only one good, so relative prices play no
role whatsoever. What happens in our case is that transfers a¤ect both the opportunity
cost and the expected revenues of war: i.e., once the potential aggressor has been loaded
with money she risks too much and can gain very little by going to war.
11Another mechanism is when the rich country destroys a part of its own resources without transfering
them to the poor. This mechanism is less powerful than the one considered here because it a¤ects relative
wealth only in one way, i.e. making the rich country less rich and not making the poor country richer.
But it may work in cases in which, by whatever reason, the poor could not receive transfers.
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3: Economic Diplomacy. Ponsatí (2004) studies bilateral conicts that a¤ect
the welfare of a third party. The conict takes the form of a war of attrition, and
intervention is modelled as the possibility that the stakeholder aids the agreement with
transfers to the contenders. In this case, the source of money is external to the conict.
4: Patents. Gallini (1984) has shown that an incumbent rm may license its
production technology to reduce the incentive of a potential entrant to develop its own,
possibly better, technology. If the licensing contract leaves the potential entrant with
its expected return from further research, it will have no incentive to engage in further
R&D activity. Thus an incumbent might decide to share its market with a potential
entrant in order to deter that entrant from engaging in R&D to displace the incumbent.
This is akin to the idea that the rich country pays the poor country in order to deter
it from attacking. But the model is di¤erent from ours since we have the problem of
preventing either country from attacking the other.
7. Appendix.
Lemma 1. Let k 2 [0:5; 1): Suppose that a peace agreement is feasible with a transfer
T^ such that after the transfer both players are unconstrained. Then, a peace agreement
is also feasible with a transfer T 0 < T^ such that only Player 2 is constrained.
Proof. Since k 2 [0:5; 1); min( 14k ; k) = 14k . Thus the constraints for T 0 are k(1+k)2 
V2+T 0
V <
1
4k . Notice rst that
k
(1+k)2
< 14k since k < 1; so T
0 can be chosen between
these bounds. Furthermore, since 14k  V2+T^V and V2+T
0
V <
1
4k ; T
0 < T^ and thus V2+T
0
V 
 k V2V +2
q
V2
V k:We nally show that T
0 can be chosen such that  k V2V +
q
V2
V k  V2+T
0
V .
Since V2V <
1
4k ;  k V2V +
q
V2
V k <
1
4 ; and since k < 1;
1
4 <
1
4k : Thus, choosing T
0 such
that V2+T
0
V ' 14k will satisfy the desiderata.
Lemma 2. Let k 2 (0; 0:5): Suppose that a peace agreement is feasible with a transfer
T^ such that after the transfer both players are constrained. Then, a peace agreement
is also feasible with a transfer T 0 < T^ such that only Player 2 is constrained.
Proof. Since k 2 (0; 0:5); min( 14k ; k) = k. Thus the constraints for T 0 are k(1+k)2 
V2+T 0
V < k. Notice rst that
k
(1+k)2
< k, so T 0 can be chosen between these bounds.
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Furthermore, since k < V2+T^V and
V2+T 0
V < k; T
0 < T^ and thus V2+T
0
V   k V2V +2
q
V2
V k:
We nally show that T 0 can be chosen such that  k V2V +
q
V2
V k  V2+T
0
V . Since
V2
V  k <
1
4k ; and  k V2V +
q
V2
V k is increasing for all
V2
V 2 [0; 14k ];  k V2V +
q
V2
V k   k2 + k < k:
Thus, choosing T 0 such that V2+T
0
V ' k will satisfy the desiderata.
Lemma 3. If before the transfer war occurs,  k V2V +
q
V2
V k  k(1+k)2 :
Proof. Since war occurs, V2V <
k
(1+k)2
: The function  k V2V +
q
V2
V k is increasing in
V2
V in the interval [0;
1
4k ]; since
k
(1+k)2
< 14k ; the maximal value in the relevant interval
is reached at V2V =
k
(1+k)2
: Thus,  k V2V +
q
V2
V k  k(1+k)2 :
Lemma 4. Let k 2 (0; 1]: There is a solution x1(k) of equation k(1+k)2 =  kx+ 2
p
xk
such that x1(k) 2 [0; k(1+k)2 ):
Proof. Let
x1(k) =
(4  2k
(1+k)2
)  4(1+k)
p
1 + k + k2
2k
: (7.1)
It is straightforward to see that x1(k) so dene is a solution of the equation k(1+k)2 =
 kx + 2pxk: Suppose that there is k 2 (0; 1] such such that x1(k) > k(1+k)2 : Since
x = k
(1+k)2
is the solution of the equation k
(1+k)2
=  kx + pxk and  kx + pxk is
increasing in x 2 [0; 14k ]; k(1+k)2 <  kx1(k) +
p
x1(k)k: But,  kx1(k) +
p
x1(k)k 
 kx1(k) + 2
p
x1(k)k =
k
(1+k)2
; which is a contradiction. Therefore, x1(k)  k(1+k)2 :
Notice rst that if k 2 [0:5; 1); 14k  k: By Lemma 3 a peace agreement in this case
is feasible if and only if
k
(1 + k)2
< min(
1
4k
; kV2
V
+ 2
r
V2
V
k): (7.2)
Lemma 5. Let k 2 [0:5; 1): There is a solution x0(k) of equation 14k =  kx + 2
p
xk
such that x0(k) 2 [0; k(1+k)2 ):
Proof. Let
x0(k) =
 0:5 + 4k  p16k2   4k
2k2
: (7.3)
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It is straightforward to see that x0(k) so dene is a solution of the equation 14k =
 kx + 2pxk: Furthermore, x0(k) is decreasing in k for all k 2 [0:5; 1). Since k(1+k)2 is
increasing in [0:5; 1); and x0(0:5) = 0:171 57 < 0:5(1+0:5)2 = 0:222 22; x0(k) 2 [0; k(1+k)2 ):
Lemma 6. Let k 2 [0:5; 1): Then, x1(k) < x0(k).
Proof. Since k
(1+k)2
< 14k for all k 2 [0:5; 1) and  kx + 2
p
xk is increasing for all
x 2 [0; k
(1+k)2
), x1(k) < x0(k):
Lemma 7. Let k 2 [0:5; 1): If V2V  x0(k); a peace agreement is feasible.
Proof. Since  kx + 2pxk is increasing for all x 2 [0; k
(1+k)2
); if V2V  x0(k) then
1
4k   k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k: Since
k
(1+k)2
< 14k ; condition (7.2) is satised, and therefore, a
peace agreement is feasible.
Lemma 8. Let k 2 [0:5; 1): If x1(k) < V2V < x0(k); a peace agreement is feasible.
Proof. Since V2V < x0(k);  k V2V +2
q
V2
V k <
1
4k : Since x1(k) <
V2
V ; and  kx+2
p
xk
is increasing for all x 2 [0; k
(1+k)2
); k
(1+k)2
<  k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k; thus condition (7.2) is
satised, and therefore, a peace agreement is feasible.
Lemma 9. Let k 2 [0:5; 1): If V2V  x1(k), there is no possibility of a peace agreement.
Proof. Clearly, if V2V  x1(k); k(1+k)2   k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k; and since x1(k) < x0(k);
 k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k <
1
4k : Thus, condition (7.2) is never satised.
Secondly, notice that if k 2 (0; 0:5); k
(1+k)2
< k < 14k : By Lemma 3 a peace agreement
in this case is feasible if and only if
k
(1 + k)2
< min(k; kV2
V
+ 2
r
V2
V
k): (7.4)
Lemma 10. Let k 2 (0; 0:5): There is a solution x2(k) of equation k =  kx + 2
p
xk
such that x2(k) 2 (0; k(1+k)2 ):
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Proof. Let
x2(k) =
2  k   2p1  k
k
: (7.5)
It is straightforward to see that x2(k) so dened is a solution of the equation k =  kx+
2
p
xk: Furthermore, x2(k) is increasing in (0; 0:5), limx!0x2(0) = 0 which coincides
with the value of k
(1+k)2
in k = 0; and x2(0:5) = 3  2
p
2 < 0:5
(1+0:5)2
= 29 : Since
k
(1+k)2
is
also increasing, it follows that x2(k) 2 (0; k(1+k)2 ):
Lemma 11. Let k 2 (0; 0:5): Then, x1(k) < x2(k).
Proof. Since k
(1+k)2
< k for all k 2 (0; 0:5) and  kx + 2pxk is increasing for all
x 2 [0; k
(1+k)2
), x1(k) < x2(k):
Lemma 12. Let k 2 (0; 0:5): If V2V  x2(k), a peace agreement is feasible.
Proof. Since  kx + 2pxk is increasing for all x 2 [0; k
(1+k)2
); if V2V  x2(k) then
k   k V2V +2
q
V2
V k: Since
k
(1+k)2
< k; condition (7.4) is satised, and therefore, a peace
agreement is feasible.
Lemma 13. Let k 2 (0; 0:5): If x1(k) < V2V < x2(k); a peace agreement is feasible.
Proof. Since V2V < x2(k);  k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k < k: Since x1(k) <
V2
V ; and  kx+ 2
p
xk
is increasing for all x 2 [0; k
(1+k)2
); k
(1+k)2
<  k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k; thus condition (7.4) is
satised, and therefore, a peace agreement is feasible.
Lemma 14. Let k 2 (0; 0:5): If V2V  x1(k), there is no possibility of a peace agreement.
Proof. Clearly, if V2V  x1(k); k(1+k)2   k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k; and since x1(k) < x2(k);
 k V2V + 2
q
V2
V k < k: Thus, condition (7.4) is never satised.
Proof of Proposition 3. If k = 1; notice that it is impossible to be in Case 3.2
or in Case 3.3 after the transfer, so we are left with Case 3.1 as the only possibility
for achieving peace. Then, conditions 1, 2, and 3 read V2V <
1
4 ;  V2V +
q
V2
V  V2+TV 
 V2V + 2
q
V2
V and
1
4  V2+TV . It can be easily shown that for V2V < 14 ,  V2V +
q
V2
V  14 :
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Thus, the transfer that brings peace exists if and only if 14 <  V2V + 2
q
V2
V , i.e. if and
only if V2V > x1(1), otherwise, is not in the interest of Player 1 to make any transfer.
It follows directly from Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 that a peace agreement for k 2 [0; 5; 1) is
feasible if and only if V2V > x1(k):
It also follows directly from Lemmas 12, 13 and 14 that a peace agreement for k 2 (0; 0:5)
is feasible if and only if V2V > x1(k):
The minimal transfer needed is such that k
(1+k)2
= V2+T^V : Notice that for such a transfer
Player 2 is indi¤erent between war and peace, since for T^
V2 + T^ = E

2 =
q
V (V2 + T^ )k   k(V2 + T^ ):
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the second stage of the game where war would
be declared when no transfers are made, but that a transfer T^ such that V2 + T^ =
V=2(1 + ) has been made. After the transfer, payo¤s for Player 1 in case of peace are
V1   T^ = V1   V
2( + 1)
+ V2 = V   V
2( + 1)
: (7.6)
Assuming that these payo¤s are less than those in the case of a war with no transfer,
V   V
2( + 1)
<
V
2( + 1)
, V < V
 + 1
; (7.7)
which is impossible. Thus, T^ yields an incentive for peace for both players. It is only
left to show that after the transfer, Player 1 is not constrained, which amounts to
V1   T^  V
2k( + 1)
, V   V
2( + 1)
 V
2k( + 1)
, k  
2 + 1
: (7.8)
By the previous Proposition, if the relatively poor player had an incentive to go to war
before the transfer,  < k. But then, k >  > 2+1 , as desired.
Proof of Proposition 6. If k = 0 and  2 (0; 1) both players are constrained and
in this situation Player 2 has an incentive to declare war since condition (4.14) holds.
The minimal transfer that could avoid war by Player 2 is such that this player has no
incentive to declare war after the transfer. That is, once the transfer has been made,
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the resources into the hands of Player 2, say V 02 ; should be such that
V 02
V
=
V 02
(V 01 + V
0
2 )
: (7.9)
But for  2 (0; 1); the above equation only holds if V 02V = 12 : But if this is the case, Player
1 is worse o¤ after the transfer than with war because
V 1
(V 1 + V

2 )
V >
1
2
V = V 01 : (7.10)
A larger transfer will be even worse for Player 1.
Proof of Proposition 7. In what follows we developed the necessary steps to
prove the Proposition
Step 1. Let T be the minimal transfer that makes Player 2 indi¤erent between war
and peace,
V2 + T
V
=
(V2 + T )

(V1   T ) + (V2 + T ) (1  k): (7.11)
Let us see that T exists and V2 + T < V=2:
Let f(x) = x

(1 x)+x (1  k): Let x0 = V2V ; by condition (4.14), x0 < f(x0): For x = 12 ;
f(12) <
1
2 : Since f is increasing in x and continuous; there is a unique x
0 2 (x0; 1=2)
such that x0 = f(x0): Let T be such that V2+TV = x
0: Since x0 2 (x0; 1=2); T > 0 and
V2 + T < V=2: Notice also that T is decreasing in V2:
Step 2. Player 2 is better o¤ with the transfer.
Since the probability of winning for Player 2 is increasing with V2;
V 2
V 1 + V

2
V (1  k) < (V2 + T )
V
(V1   T ) + (V2 + T ) (1  k) = V2 + T: (7.12)
Step 3. Both players still constrained after the transfer.
Clearly, if Player 1 was initially constrained, he is also constrained after the transfer.
Furthermore, since V2+T < V=2 and Player 1 is constrained, Player 2 is also constrained.
Step 4. Neither Player 1, Player 2, has an incentive to declare war after the transfer.
Since both players are constrained, in case of war the expected utility of Player 2 is
(V2 + T )

(V1   T ) + (V2 + T ) (1  k): (7.13)
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and by the denition of T (7.11), Player 2 does not have an incentive for going to war.
Neither does Player 1 by the same argument as before the transfer.
Step 5. For all V2  V2; Player 1 is better o¤ after the transfer.
Let us see that the following inequality holds,
V 1
(V 1 + V

2 )
V (1  k)  V1   T = V 01 (7.14)
Proving inequality (7.14) is equivalent to proving that
V 02  V  
V 1
(V 1 + V

2 )
V (1  k): (7.15)
Or that
V 02
V
 k + V

2
(V 1 + V

2 )
(1  k): (7.16)
Since V2 is such that the minimal transfer that makes Player 2 indi¤erent between war
and peace is kV; and V2  V2; T  kV: Thus,
V 02
V
=
V2
V
+
T
V
 V2
V
+ k: (7.17)
Furthermore, since Player 2 is better o¤ with war if the transfer is not made,
V2
V
<
V 2
(V 1 + V

2 )
(1  k): (7.18)
Which combined with (7.17) gives inequality (7.16) as we wanted to prove.
Proof of Proposition 10. It is easy to see that V2V >
 2
 1 is equivalent to
G(; V2V ) <

( 1)
V
V2
: Let us see that we can nd a transfer from Player 2 to Player
1 that avoids war.
Consider the following picture where x  V2V (this is the case for  = 2 where
G(2; x) = x+ (2=x)  2) and clearly G(2; x) < (2=x)).
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The red line is 1k =

( 1)x and the black line is
1
k = (x+
1
x   2) + 2  x. The area
to the right of both is the area where there is war. Starting from any point in this area,
say ( 1k ; x), dene x
0  k 1 : Let x0 be the new distribution of resources after the transfer
has been made. Notice rst that both players remain constrained after the transfer.
Because of the denition of the new distribution of resources, after the transfer Player
1 has no incentive to declare war. What it is not clear is whether he will accept the
transfer. So, we have to see that
E1(V1; V2) =
V1V (1  k)
V1 + V2
 V 01 = V   V 02 = V (1 
k
(  1)): (7.19)
The left hand side is clearly increasing in V1; thus
V1V (1  k)
V1 + V   V1 <
V 01V (1  k)
V 01 + V   V 01
= V 01 : (7.20)
Finally, let us prove that Player 2 is also better o¤. So we have to compare the payo¤s
of player2 at x0 = V k( 1) with the payo¤s should a war arise,
V2V (1 k)
V V2+V2 . What we
want to prove is that
V2(1  k)
V   V2 + V2 
k
(  1) :
33
Notice rst that when  ! 1; the left hand side tends to zero and the right hand
side tends to k. Secondly, when  ! 1; the left hand side tends to V2(1   k) and
the right hand side tends to 1: Thus, if the inequality were the other way around
for some value of  there must be, generically, two positive solutions to the equation
V2(1  k)(  1) = k(V  V2+V2). It is easy to see that this equation has, at most,
one positive root. Thus, there must be a contradiction.
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